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  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 In September of 2005, Benjamin D. Share pleaded guilty in the midst of a 
jury trial to one count of conspiring to defraud the United States by receiving and 
giving illegal gratuities, committing wire fraud and money laundering in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1503.  See United States v. Share, 223 F. App’x. 103, 105 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Thereafter, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
adopted the presentence report and imposed a sentence of 60 months on each 
count, to run consecutively.  Share unsuccessfully challenged his sentence. 
 Share is now “over 84 years of age” and “has served over two-thirds of his 
sentence.”  In his view, he is “suffering from a combination of serious and chronic 
physical maladies which . . . all but put him in the ‘terminal stage’ by any 
reasonable medical definition.”  Because of his alleged “terminal” condition, Share 
sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
1
  The Warden at 
                                                 
1 Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) provides: 
 
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed except that (1) in any case – (A) the court, upon motion of 
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may reduce the term of 
3 
 
FCI Schuylkill, however, determined that Share was a “stable chronic care 
individual” and denied the request. 
Thereafter, in December of 2012, Share filed a petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  He asserted that he was attacking neither his conviction nor his 
sentence.  Instead, he claimed that he was challenging the execution of his sentence 
by “proceeding under an independent action before the Court to secure his release 
for home confinement” and “seeking review of the [BOP]’s apparent or deemed 
denial of his request for compassionate release/relief” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  
According to Share, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has “failed to provide and/or 
sufficiently and adequately provide treatment for his serious, chronic and likely 
terminal medical maladies, particularly in light of his advanced age of over 84 
years, all in violation of his 8th Amendment constitutional rights.”   
In a decision issued on December 26, 2012, the District Court dismissed that 
portion of the petition challenging the adequacy of Share’s medical care without 
                                                                                                                                                             
imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised 
release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved 
portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the 
factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are 
applicable, if it finds that (i) extraordinary and compelling reasons 
warrant such a reduction.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
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prejudice to asserting the claim in a civil rights action.  With regard to the request 
for compassionate release, the District Court acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) allows the Court to grant relief if a motion is in fact filed by the 
BOP.  This statutory section, the Court concluded, vested the BOP with broad 
discretion in deciding whether to seek a modification of a prisoner’s sentence on 
compassionate release grounds.  The Court found persuasive the position of other 
courts that the “BOP’s decision regarding whether or not to file a motion for 
compassionate release is judicially unreviewable.”  Share’s counsel filed a notice 
of appeal the following day.
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 Share’s counsel correctly acknowledged at oral argument that he cannot 
prevail under the compassionate release provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  
Indeed, without a motion from the BOP, the district courts have no authority to 
reduce a federal inmate’s sentence based on special circumstances.  See United 
States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 Rather, counsel confirmed that he sought an expansion of this court’s 
decision in Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005), which 
would include inadequate medical treatment as a basis for relief under § 2241.  
Counsel’s request, however, fails to account for our decision in Cardona v. 
                                                 
2
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s “dismissal of a habeas petition 
on jurisdictional grounds.”  Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012). 
In Cardona, we considered whether the prisoner’s suit should have been 
maintained as an action under § 2241 or a civil rights action under Bivens.  
Cardona challenged his placement in the Special Management Unit of the 
correctional facility in which he was housed.  We pointed out that a § 2241 petition 
must challenge the execution of the prisoner’s sentence.  Id. at 535.  We 
acknowledged that the “precise meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy” 
and that in Woodall we “defined execution as meaning to put into effect or carry 
out.”  Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536 (quoting Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We noted that the §  2241 petitions in Woodall and 
McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 936-37 (3d Cir. 2010), “challenged BOP 
conduct that conflicted with express statements in the applicable sentencing 
judgment.”  Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536.  Thus, we concluded that “[i]n order to 
challenge the execution of his sentence under § 2241, Cardona would need to 
allege that BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or 
recommendation in the sentence judgment.”  Id. at 537.  Because Cardona’s 
petition did not allege such an inconsistency, and because it did not concern how 
the BOP was “‘carrying out’ or ‘putting into effect’ his sentence, as directed in his 
sentencing judgment,” we concluded that Cardona’s “claims were not properly 
brought” under § 2241.  Id. 
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Here, as in Cardona, there is no inconsistency between the BOP’s conduct 
and the District Court’s judgment.  Because the BOP is carrying out the sentence 
imposed by the District Court, we conclude that Share’s petition does not concern 
the execution, the carrying out, nor the putting into effect of his sentence.  
Cardona, 681 F.3d at 537.  Accordingly, Share’s petition, despite the title it bears, 
is not properly brought as a § 2241 petition.  For that reason, the District Court did 
not err in dismissing it.
3
  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Share’s petition does not assert a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  It neither seeks 
to invalidate Share’s convictions nor challenges the duration of his sentence.  
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Muhammad v. Close, 
540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (instructing that “[c]hallenges to the validity of any 
confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas 
corpus”). 
